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ABSTRACT  
In recent decades agri-environment schemes (AES) have become an increasingly 
important tool for policy makers aiming to reverse the post-war decline in 
environmental quality on agricultural land. The voluntary nature of such schemes 
means that the decision of farmers to participate is central to achieving policy 
objectives. This paper therefore uses a choice experiment approach to investigate the 
role that scheme design can have on encouraging farmers to participate. Choice data 
was gathered from a survey of farmers in 10 case study areas across the EU and 
analysed using both mixed logit and latent class models. In general, farmers were 
found to require greater financial incentives to join schemes with longer contracts or 
that offer less flexibility or higher levels of paperwork. It was also observed that a 
large segment of farmers (‘low resistance adopters’) would be willing to accept 
relatively small incentive payments for their participation in schemes offering 
relatively little flexibility and high levels of additional paperwork, when compared to 
other more ‘high resistance adopters’. 
 
Keywords: farmers; agri-environment; participation; choice experiments; mixed 
logit; latent class 
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Introduction 
The voluntary nature of agri-environment schemes (AES) means that the participation 
of farmers is central to achieving policy objectives (Wilson, 1996). There has been 
considerable research interest in identifying the factors that influence participation 
(e.g. Vanslembrouck et al., 2002). Brotherton (1989, 1991) stated that both ‘farmer 
factors’ and ‘scheme factors’ need to be taken into consideration when attempting to 
understand farmer participation in AES. Farmer factors include various individual 
farmer and farm characteristics such as age, education and farm size. Scheme factors 
are those that may influence the economic attractiveness of a particular scheme and 
include the financial incentives offered and a range of other design elements such as 
the length of the AES contract and the ability of the farmers to choose what land they 
wish to enter into a scheme.  
 
Following Brotherton (1989), the literature relating to farmers participation in AES 
(the so called adoption studies) has mainly concentrated on the farmer factors 
influencing participation behaviour (e.g. Morris and Potter, 1995; Wilson, 1997; 
Wilson and Hart, 2000; Wynn et al., 2001; Wossink and Wenum, 2003; 
Vanslembrouk et al., 2002; see Siebert et al, 2006 for a review). The general 
consensus seems to be that participation in AES is positively influenced by farm size, 
educational attainment and by a farmer’s interest in conservation, but negatively 
related to a farmer’s age. Although such endogenous factors may influence 
participation decisions, they are of limited interest to policy-makers as they are not 
readily amenable to change. Falconer (2000) notes that too great a focus on farmer 
factors is unprofitable, as the private transaction costs associated with participation in 
a particular scheme also need to be taken into account. Mettepenningen et al. (this 
issue), investigate the impact of private transactions costs, focusing on potential 
methodologies for their measurement. Other studies apply the principal-agent theory 
to analyse the design of AES, focusing on the implications of information 
asymmetries for contract design (e.g. Moxey et al., 1999; Ozanne et al., 2001).  
 
Unlike the studies just described, this paper focuses on the role that the design of AES 
contracts can have on encouraging farmers to participate in AES. Therefore, rather 
than investigating how farmer factors influence entry into AES contracts of uniform 
design, this study concentrates on the role that scheme factors can have on increasing 
the likelihood of participation of different groups of farmers.  This topic remains 
largely unaddressed by the literature and this study helps to fill in a significant gap.  
 
This study employs a choice experiment approach (Louviere et al., 2002) to 
investigate farmers’ preferences for key elements of AES design. Modelling farmers’ 
choices permits us to estimate how they would trade-off different levels of these 
design elements against per hectare payments. Knowledge of such trade-offs can 
inform AES design and the incentives offered to potential participants. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the choice modelling approach 
adopted in this paper. In section 3, we describe the design and implementation of the 
choice experiments. Section 4 reports the findings from the analysis of the choice data 
and some conclusions for the design of AES are drawn in the final section. 
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The choice experiment approach 
In the last decade the choice experiment (CE) approach has increasingly been used to 
value the effects of quality changes in environmental attributes (e.g. Adamowicz et 
al., 1998; Garrod and Willis, 1999; Hanley et al., 2001; Hanley et al., 2006). Choice 
experiments are particularly well suited to measuring the marginal value of the 
attributes of a good or policy. A recent development in the method is to define 
attributes in terms of the different aspects of (environmental) policy design, rather 
than in terms of the characteristics of the environmental goods themselves (Hanley et 
al., 2003). This is the approach taken by this study.  
 
The CE approach is consistent with Lancaster’s theory of consumer choice 
(Lancaster, 1966) which postulates that consumption decisions are determined by the 
utility that is derived from the attributes of a good, rather than from the good per se. 
The econometric basis of the approach rests on the behavioural framework of random 
utility theory, which describes discrete choices in a utility maximising framework 
(McFadden, 1974; Ben-Akiva and Lerman, 1985). Statistical analyses of the 
responses obtained from CE can be used to derive the marginal values for attributes of 
a good or policy or an individual’s willingness to pay to gain an outcome with a more 
desirable combination of characteristics.  
 
The multinomial logit (MNL) model (McFadden, 1974) is the most commonly used 
discrete choice model for the analysis of results from choice experiments. While the 
relative simplicity of the MNL model is a clear advantage, it has some important 
limitations. For example, the MNL framework imposes homogenous preferences 
across respondents and its concomitant assumption of the independence of irrelevant 
alternatives (IIA) (Hausman and McFadden, 1984). Preferences, however, may be 
heterogeneous and accounting for the presence of heterogeneity enables computations 
of unbiased estimates of individual preferences. In addition, accounting for preference 
heterogeneity provides a broader picture of the distributional consequences and other 
impacts of policy actions and provides better insight on policy outcomes.  
 
Among the recent innovations aimed at accounting for preference heterogeneity in 
choice models are the mixed logit (Train, 1998; McFadden and Train, 2000) and 
latent class models are a special case of these (Wedel and Kamakura, 2000). These 
models represent advanced alternative approaches for characterising the distribution 
of preferences in a given population. The mixed logit model accounts for preference 
heterogeneity by allowing utility parameters to vary randomly (and continuously) 
over individuals. The latent class model, on the other hand, postulates a discrete 
distribution of tastes in which individuals are intrinsically sorted into a number 
segments (or classes), each characterised by homogenous segments though 
heterogeneous across segments (Boxall and Adamowicz, 2002). The specification and 
estimation of these models as applied in this paper are outlined below.  
 
Formally, in each choice occasion, a respondent faces a choice between J=2 
alternatives (plus an option to choose neither). Each respondent is presented a series 
of T=4 choices. In this study the three alternatives that the respondent faces in a 
particular choice occasion are two AES policy options described in terms of key 
design attributes (duration of AES contract, per hectare payment rate, etc) and the 
“choose neither” option. The attributes of alternative i in choice occasion t faced by 
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respondent n are collectively labelled as vector Xint. The utility that respondent n 
derives from choosing alternative i on choice occasion t is give by: 
 
Uint = βnXint + int        (1) 
 
where the coefficient vector n, representing individual tastes, is unobserved and 
varies randomly in the population with density denoted f(n|θ), where θ represents the 
parameters of this distribution. int is an unobserved random term that is assumed to be 
independent and identically distributed (iid) according to an extreme value 
distribution. Conditional on n, the probability that the respondent chooses alternative 
i in choice occasion t is a standard MNL (McFadden, 1974), since int’s are distributed 
extreme value: 
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Let ynt denote the respondent’s chosen alternative in choice occasion t, and let yn = 
(yn1=, …., ynT) denote the respondent’s sequence of choices in the T choice occasions. 
The joint probability of the respondent’s sequence of choices, conditional on n, is the 
product of standard logits: 
 
)|,(.).|1,()|( .....1 nnTnnnn TyLyLyP   .     (3) 
 
However, the researcher does not observe n. Only its density f(|θ) is assumed to be 
known, so the unconditional probability of the respondents sequence of choices is the 
integral of equation 3 over all possible values of n weighted by the population 
density of n as shown in equation 4.  
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The distribution of  can be specified as either continuous or discrete. As noted 
above, a model with continuously distributed coefficients results in a mixed logit 
model (McFadden and Train, 2000). A model in which the coefficients follow a 
discrete distribution and given class membership preferences are homogeneous is, on 
the other hand, called a latent class model (LCM). In the LCM, the mixing 
distribution f(n|θ) in equation 4 is discrete with n taking a finite set of values, one 
set for each class. In this case, it is assumed that the population consists of a number 
of unobservable (latent) segments (or classes) each characterized by relatively 
homogenous tastes, but where preferences vary considerably between segments. The 
LCM has been frequently applied in market research (for a review, see Wedel and 
Kamakura (2000)). More recently, LCMs have been used in recreational demand 
revealed preference studies (e.g. Scarpa and Thiene, 2005; Haynes et. al., 2008) and 
stated preference applications (e.g. Boxall and Adamowicz, 2002; Garrod et. al., 
2002; Greene and Hensher, 2003; Birol et al., 2006; Ruto et. al., 2008).  
 
The log-likelihood for both models is given by )(ln)( 
N
n n
yPLL  . In the mixed 
logit estimation, this expression cannot be evaluated analytically because the choice 
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probability (equation 4) does not have a closed form. Hence it is approximated using 
simulation methods (Train, 2003). In particular, a number of draws of  is taken from 
its density f(|θ). For each draw, the product of logits in equation 3 is calculated, and 
the results are averaged over draws. The simulated log-likelihood used in estimation 
is given by: 
 
  






N
n
r
nMXL yP
R
SLL
1
)|(
1
ln)(  ,      (5) 
 
where R is the number of replications (i.e. draws of ), r is the rth draw. We use 
Halton intelligent draws for the simulation, which have been found to provide far 
greater accuracy than independent random draws in the estimation of mixed logit 
models (Train, 2003). The log-likelihood for the LCM with S latent segments is given 
by: 
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where P(s) is the probability that individual n belongs to segment s and s is a vector 
of class-specific coefficients. Following Greene and Hensher (2003), P(s) is specified 
to have the MNL form: 
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where zn is a set observed individual characteristics which enter the model for class 
membership probability and s is a vector of segment-specific parameters to be 
estimated. In this paper, we employ logit models with continuous mixing of taste to 
identify the existence of preference heterogeneity and the latent class type of finite 
mixing to estimate the segment-specific utility parameters. Rather than treating them 
as competing modelling approaches, as has been the case in most previous studies, we 
view both models as having complementary strengths and weaknesses which can be 
exploited to enhance our understanding of the preferences underlying observed 
choices. 
Choice experiment design and implementation 
Choice experiment design 
This study was part of a larger EU research project Integrated Tools to design and 
implement Agri-Environment Schemes (ITAES-SSPE-CT-2003-502070) aimed at 
exploring potential methodologies for optimal design and evaluation of AES, drawing 
from the lessons learnt in the implementation of AES under EU regulation 2078/92. 
The project involved ten EU case studies
 
(reported later in Table 2) and was 
conducted between 2004 and 2007. The CE was incorporated into a large sample 
survey of farmers conducted across the ten case study areas (CSAs).  Responses were 
collected both for farmers who were currently enrolled in AES and those who were 
not (see Arnaud et al., 2006 for details of the survey).  
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The main objective of the choice experiment (CE) was to investigate farmers’ 
preferences for key design attributes of AES. Importantly, for the broader objectives 
of the study, these attributes should both be under the control of policy-makers and 
likely to have a significant influence on the likelihood of farmers participating in the 
schemes.  Given that AES differ widely across the EU in terms of their 
implementation and what they require of farmers, the challenge at the initial stage of 
CE design was to select common scheme attributes so as to maximise the scope of the 
study to investigate preferences for scheme design both within and across countries or 
CSAs. The choice of attributes and levels was based on a combination of evidence 
from the literature and information from focus group discussions with farmers in 
several of the CSAs. The focus group discussions were used to investigate farmers’ 
attitudes towards AES design elements and to gather background information on what 
aspects of the design of AES are important to farmers in their participation decision-
making, i.e. the scheme factors that are likely to ‘tip the balance’ in favour of (or 
against) participation. The group discussions also served as an opportunity to test out 
alternative approaches to the implementation of the CE. The five key scheme 
attributes and their associated levels are reported in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Attributes and attribute levels in choice experiments 
Scheme attribute Description Attribute levels 
Minimum length of agreement 
(years) 
Duration of AES contract 5, 10, 20* 
 
Flexibility over what areas of 
the farm are entered into the 
scheme? 
whether or not the scheme 
allows flexibility over which 
areas of the farm are entered into 
the scheme 
No, Yes 
 
Flexibility over undertaking 
some of the measures required 
under the scheme? 
whether or not the scheme 
allows flexibility over adherence 
to scheme prescriptions 
No, Yes 
 
Average time spent on 
paperwork/administration 
levels of administration as 
measured by the amount of time 
spent on non-operational aspects 
of the scheme, such as on paper-
work and information gathering 
Low, Medium, 
High 
 
Additional payment per ha The per hectare payment rate 
made under the scheme 
5%, 10%, 20% 
* to take account of national differences 2, 5 and 10 years were used as the minimum 
length of agreement attributes in the Czech Republic 
 
 
There was little evidence in the literature on important scheme design factors that 
explain participation. One notable exception is Wynn et al (2001) who found that 
scheme flexibility is an important determinant of entry into Environmentally Sensitive 
Area (ESA) schemes in Scotland. They found that farmers who could choose options 
that fitted better into their farm operations were more likely to participate.  
 
In the CEs, farmers were asked to consider future changes to the design of a particular 
AES. For participants in an existing AES this had to be a scheme they were already 
members of, while for those farmers currently not in a scheme, the CE asked them to 
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consider an existing scheme with which they were familiar, and had perhaps thought 
of joining.   
 
The set of attributes within the CE was selected to capture key features of AES design 
that the government is able to influence through policy design, as well as the cost of 
the schemes to the taxpayer. For example, the government can decide whether or not 
to give farmers flexibility in selecting the areas of the farm to enter into the scheme or 
to adopt a whole-farm approach; whether or not to allow flexibility over adherence to 
scheme prescriptions; and whether to offer short or long term contracts. Set up in this 
way, the CE enables us to explore the increases in per hectare payments that farmers 
would require in return for accepting less-desirable contractual conditions or to assess 
the proportion of their payments that they are willing to trade off in order to enter 
schemes that have more attractive attributes.  
 
A large number of unique AES configurations can be constructed from the selected 
number of attributes and levels (Table 1). Experimental design techniques (see 
Louviere et al., 2000) and SPSS Conjoint software were used to obtain an orthogonal 
main effects design. This resulted in 24 paired choice profiles which were then 
randomly blocked into six sets of four. Each paired choice profile offered respondents 
a choice of two alternative AES designs (Policy A and Policy B).  To conduct the CE 
respondents are asked which of the two alternatives they preferred, but are allowed to 
state that they prefer neither. An example choice set (referred to as ‘choice card’ in 
CE literature) is shown in Figure 1. Inclusion of an “opt out” alternative, which in this 
case is the “choose neither” option, avoids a forced choice by allowing respondents to 
select neither alternative in the choice set and serves to make the results obtained 
consistent with demand theory (Hanley et al., 2001). Each respondent was presented 
with a series of four choice tasks (i.e. one of the six blocks of four pairs) yielding a 
data set of between 400 and 1300 choices across CSAs. In addition, as respondents 
were completing the choice tasks, a card was provided reminding them of the 
meaning of each attribute and the levels it could take.  
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We would like to ask you to make choices between two ways in which AES could be 
designed in the future. Assuming the following AES contracts were the ONLY 
choices you have, which one would you prefer? Please note that nothing else would 
change apart from the design elements listed. Remember that by answering carefully 
and honestly you will help to ensure that future contracts are made more attractive to 
farmers. 
Agreement Element Policy A Policy B 
The minimum length of 
your agreement (years) 
20 10 
The right to choose the 
areas of your farm that you 
enter into the scheme 
YES NO 
The right to choose not to 
undertake at least some of 
the measures required by 
the scheme 
NO YES 
The average amount of 
time you spend each week 
on non-operational aspects 
of the scheme, e.g. 
paperwork, information 
gathering etc 
MEDIUM 
(BETWEEN 2 AND 5 
HOURS PER WEEK) 
HIGH 
(MORE THAN 5 HOURS 
PER WEEK) 
Additional payment per ha 
made under the scheme 
5 % 20 % 
Figure 1. An example choice experiment choice card  
 
 
Choice experiment data collection 
The CE survey was administered between May and December 2005 using face-to-
face interviews with farmers. As mentioned earlier, the CE’s were incorporated as 
part of a much larger questionnaire administered by the ITAES project across the ten 
European CSAs under investigation (i.e. the same questions were asked in each CSA). 
Although the CSA’s were selected opportunistically, the sample covered a variety of 
institutional contexts and farming systems across the EU (although the Southern EU 
states were under represented in the project).  
 
The survey targeted both participants and non-participants in AES, with a quota of 
about 50 per cent of the sample allocated to each group. Non-participants included 
both farmers who are not eligible to join an AES and those who had the opportunity to 
join but chose not to. In each CSA, random samples of participants and non-
participants were drawn from lists of farmers provided by the government agencies or 
commercial sources. Table 2 provides an overview of the number of AES participants 
and non-participants interviewed in each CSA. Overall 1,247 participants and 1,015 
non-participants were interviewed.  
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Table 2. Case study areas and the number of participants and non-participants 
surveyed 
Country Case study area 
(CSA) 
Participants Non-participants 
United Kingdom North East of 
England 
110 109 
France Basse-Normandie 171 157 
Netherlands Friesland 163 58 
Belgium Flanders 199 109 
Germany Brandenburg 126 80 
Italy Emilia-Romagna 75 75 
Italy Veneto 82 68 
Ireland whole country 147 149 
Finland whole country 34 71 
Czech Republic whole country 140 139 
Total  1247 1015 
 
 
Results and discussion 
This section presents a selection of results from an extensive analysis of the CE data 
collected in the study. The data set contains 20 sub-samples—10 CSA samples each 
with AES participants and non-participant sub-samples separated (see Table 2). Due 
to space constraints, the focus here is on the estimation results based on the pooled 
sample across the 10 CSAs. Individual CSA results are available in Ruto and Garrod 
(2006) or from the authors upon request. In general, however, the analysis revealed 
considerable similarity in preferences for AES attributes across the CSAs. The list of 
variable used in the analysis is presented in Table 3 
 
Table 3. Description of variables used in the analysis of choices  
Variable Description 
Clength Contract length (5 years, 10 years, 20 years) 
Fland Flexibility over what areas of the farm or land are entered 
into the scheme? (1=Yes; 0 otherwise) 
Fmeas Flexibility over undertaking some of the measures required 
under the scheme? (1= Yes; 0 otherwise) 
Lowpw Average time spent on paperwork/administration; 1=Low 
(less than 2 hours a week)*; 0 otherwise 
Medpw Average time spent on paperwork/administration; 
1=Medium (between 2 and 5 hours per week)*; 0 
otherwise) 
Highpw Average time spent on paperwork/administration; 1=High 
(more than 5 hours per week); 0 otherwise 
Payment 
 
Additional payment per ha (5%; 10%; 20%) 
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Table 3 (Continued..) 
Variable Description 
Age Age of farm head in years 
Hedu Education level; 1=Higher education (at least post 
secondary level); 0 otherwise 
Successor Successor factor; (1=if farmer has successor; 0 otherwise)  
Envicon A measure of environmental consciousness based on a 
series of questions relating to respondent’s level of 
participation in environmental organisations and frequency 
of purchase of environmental publications and 
environmentally friendly products. (1=More 
environmentally conscious; 0 otherwise) 
Farmsize Farm size (total utilisable agricultural area) 
Lfarm Large farm (1 if farm is >200 ha, 0 otherwise) 
Rentprop Proportion of farm that is rented  
Fincdep Dependency on farm for income (1=more than 50% of the 
farmer’s income is from the farm business; 0 otherwise) 
 
 
The maximum likelihood estimates for the mixed logit models, estimated on the 
participant, non-participant and pooled samples are reported in Table 4. The utility 
parameters for all AES attributes were entered as random parameters assuming a 
normal distribution, except the payment attribute which was specified as fixed. The 
models were estimated using maximum simulated likelihood procedures in 
Limdep/Nlogit version 3.0 (Greene, 2002) utilizing 100 Halton draws for the 
simulations
1
. In all the three samples, all the AES attributes are statistically significant 
(at 1% level) in explaining farmers’ choices and the coefficient for payment enters 
with the expected positive sign. Also shown in Table 4 are the estimated standard 
deviations of the distribution of taste parameters in the population. The standard 
deviations of all the random coefficients are highly statistically significant indicating 
that these coefficients are indeed heterogeneous in the population. 
 
  
                                                 
1
 Likelihood ratio tests reject the null hypothesis that an MNL model fits the data better than the mixed 
logit model estimated on each of the three samples. A specification test of the MNL model to test the 
assumption of IIA (Hausman and McFadden 1984) also rejects the null hypotheses that IIA holds 
(p<0.01) confirming that less restrictive specifications that do not impose IIA such as the mixed logit 
and latent models should be employed. 
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Table 4: Mixed logit estimates for AES attributes 
 Participants Non-participants Pooled sample 
 Coeff. 
(t-value) 
Coeff. SD 
(t-value) 
Coeff. 
(t-value) 
Coeff. SD 
(t-value) 
Coeff. 
(t-value) 
Coeff. SD 
(t-value) 
Clenght -0.138  
(17.51) 
0.166 
(18.74) 
-0.151 
(-16.23) 
0.171 
(16.02) 
-0.143 
(23.85) 
0.167 
(25.07) 
Fland 0.977 
(13.23) 
1.18 
(11.33) 
0.911 
(11.11) 
1.256 
(10.35) 
0.944 
(17.23) 
1.213 
(15.05) 
Fmeas 0.832 
(12.18) 
1.11 
(10.02) 
0.525 
(6.03) 
1.636 
(13.01) 
0.703 
(12.90) 
1.368 
(16.84) 
Highpw -0.774 
(9.51) 
0.854 
(5.28) 
-0.650 
(7.20) 
0.817 
(4.57) 
-0.719 
(11.85) 
0.868 
(7.33) 
Payment 0.110 
(22.72) 
- 0.097 
(18.06) 
- 0.104 
(29.0) 
- 
Log-L -4393.39 -3669.83 -8089.06 
Adj. Pseudo-R
2
 0.194 0.173 0.183 
N (respondents) 1247 1015 2262 
N (choices) 4988 4060 9048 
 
 
The results reveal that farmers were found, on average, to prefer shorter rather than 
longer contracts. They also indicate that farmers have a positive preference for greater 
flexibility over what areas of the farm are entered into the scheme and for greater 
flexibility over scheme prescriptions or measures to undertake (hereinafter referred to, 
respectively, as “flexibility over land” and “flexibility over measures”). As expected, 
they also prefer lower levels of paperwork. As mentioned previously, this attribute 
was described in the CE as the amount of time spent in non-operations aspects of the 
scheme (High, Medium, Low) such as paperwork and information gathering.  
 
The inclusion of payment as one of the factors affecting the probability of choice 
provided the basis to estimate the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) between the 
attributes and money using the results in Table 4. This implies that we can interpret 
the ratios as the marginal WTP for a change in each attribute (Haneman, 1984). 
Because the impact of each attribute is not predetermined, the marginal WTP values 
can be either positive or negative. In our CE, the monetary attribute was described in 
terms of a change to annual per hectare payments, hence positive values indicate the 
increase in per hectare payments (as a percentage of current levels) that farmers 
would be willing to trade-off or forgo in order to gain schemes with more desirable 
attributes. Conversely, negative values indicate the percentage increase in the levels 
of payments farmers would demand in return for accepting less desirable contractual 
obligations. In the discussion of the results the abbreviation WTP will be used in all 
cases with the sign indicating the nature of the impact of the attribute. Table 5 
presents marginal WTP estimates as a percentage of current payments.  
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Table 5. Marginal WTP for AES attributes as a percentage of current payments 
 Participants Non-participants Pooled sample 
Clenght 
-1.25  
(-1.37 to -1.14)
a 
-1.56  
(-1.72 to -1.39) 
-1.37  
(-1.47 to -1.28) 
FLand 
8.88  
(7.63-10.14) 
9.40  
(7.74-11.06) 
9.08  
(8.80-10.09) 
FMeas 
7.57  
(6.41-8.73) 
5.42  
(3.81-7.03) 
6.76 
(5.80-7.72) 
Highpw 
-7.04  
(-8.23 to -5.85) 
-6.70  
(-8.23 to -5.18) 
-6.91 
(-7.86 to -5.97) 
a 
Ninety five percent confidence intervals obtained from asymptotic standard errors 
approximated by means of the delta method 
 
 
All of the WTP estimates are statistically significant at below the 1 percent level. It is 
interesting to note that WTP estimates for participants and non-participants are not 
statistically different. A simple visual examination of this is confirmed by the large 
overlap of confidence intervals of WTP for both samples. This suggests that whether 
or not a farmer is a participant in AES does not seem to be a significant source of 
heterogeneity in preferences for scheme attributes. The results suggest that farmers, 
on average, would be willing to trade off about 6-10% of their current payments in 
order to gain flexibility over land or measure in AES. They would demand an increase 
of 6-8% of current per hectare payment in return for accepting higher levels of paper 
work and just over 1% for an increase in the duration of contract by one year. 
 
To investigate the possible sources of heterogeneity in preferences, we introduce 
interactions between the mean estimate of the utility parameters and farm/farmer 
characteristics (farmer factors) in a mixed logit model estimated on the pooled sample 
of participants and non-participants. After extensive testing of various interactions 
with farmer factors collected in the survey, the model that interact mean preference 
for contract length with these covariates was found to fit the data best. The results are 
reported in Table 6. The top part of the table reports estimates of mean taste or 
preference in the population and the bottom part contain estimates of standard 
deviations of parameter distributions. Of particular interest are interaction effects of 
contact length with farmer factors which are reported in the middle section of the 
Table. These are estimates of ‘shifts’ in mean taste of contract length occasioned by 
the relevant farmer factors. The results show that age of respondent, whether or not 
the farmer has a successor, level of environmental awareness, farm size, proportion of 
land rented and, level of dependence on farm income are significant sources of 
heterogeneity in preferences for duration of contract. However, the standard deviation 
of the distribution of Clength coefficient is still highly significant, which indicate that 
preferences for duration of contract vary more than is captured by these factors.  
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Table 6. Mixed logit with interactions estimates for AES attributes 
Attribute Coefficient Std. Error p-value 
Clength -0.0518 0.0290 0.0746 
FLand 0.846 0.0590 0.000 
FMeas 0.715 0.0664 0.000 
Highpw -0.733 0.0676 0.000 
Payment 0.108 0.00365 0.000 
Heterogeneity in mean parameter for contract length 
Age -0.000766 0.000478 0.10 
Education -0.0101 0.0105 0.340 
Successor -0.0363 0.0152 0.017 
Envicon 0.0181 0.0103 0.079 
Farm-size 0.0535 0.0169 0.002 
Rentprop -0.0829 0.0137 0.000 
Fincdep -0.0269 0.0105 0.0107 
Standard deviations of parameter distributions 
sdClenght 0.163 0.0072 0.000 
sdFLand 1.186 0.0886 0.000 
sdFMeas 1.387 0.0914 0.000 
sdHighpw 0.960 0.129 0.000 
sdPayment    
Log-L=-6912.66; Adj. Pseudo-R
2
=0.183; N (respondents)=2262; N (choices)= 9048 
 
 
Though farmers, on the whole, preferred shorter rather than longer AES contracts, 
preferences for shorter contract lengths were higher for the older farmers. In other 
words, older farmers were more likely to demand higher per hectare payments for 
longer contracts than younger farmers. The level of farmers’ formal education did not 
seem to significantly influence preferences for duration of AES contract. Whether or 
not a farmer has a successor also appeared to be important in decisions regarding 
duration of contract. The coefficient value suggests that farmers generally have a 
preference for not encumbering a successor with a contract that they have negotiated. 
Encouragingly, it was also noted that favourable attitudes towards the environment 
reduces the marginal disutility of farmers for long contracts.  
 
Farm size had a significant influence on preferences for AES contract length. Farmers 
with holdings over 200 ha had a higher preference for longer term contracts than those 
with smaller holdings. Most previous research on the uptake of AES has found that 
farmers with larger holdings are more likely to participate in such schemes. The per 
hectare payment methods used in most AES may disproportionately benefit larger 
farms over small farmers (especially in whole-farm agreements) and hence larger 
farms may find longer contract lengths provide advantageous in terms of a guaranteed 
future income stream.  Similarly, such farms may experience greater economies of 
scale in terms of administration and training.  Tenure status also seemed to have a 
significant effect on preferences for contact length. Farmers who rent the majority of 
their holdings were found to have a greater preference for shorter term AES contracts 
than those who owned most of their farms. It is unclear whether such preferences 
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reflect uncertainties over the duration of tenancies or the influence of landlords who 
might not wish their land to be tied into a longer-term contract. 
 
Farm households that rely mainly on their farms for income (i.e. that are dependent on 
the farm for more than half of their income) are less likely to enter into longer term 
contracts than farm households that are less reliant on the farm for income. It could be 
argued that the unwillingness of farmers who are more reliant on farm incomes to 
commit themselves to longer term AES contracts could be explained by the 
potentially greater opportunity costs of such arrangements in terms of income 
foregone should market conditions change and the profits available from more 
intensive farming techniques increase. On the other hand, it could be argued plausibly 
that farmers who rely mainly on the farm for their incomes may be more likely to 
welcome the additional financial security offered by longer term AES agreements. In 
the AES participation literature, dependency on farm income has proved to be an 
ambiguous variable in explaining participation decisions (Wilson, 1997). It should be 
noted that the factors identified here as having a positive influence on preferences for 
longer contracts mirror those that have been identified in the literature as having a 
positive influence on AES participation (e.g. Wilson, 1997; Ducos et al., this issue).  
 
We now turn to the results of the latent class model (LCM). First, an important issue 
in the empirical application of latent class models is the number of segments to be 
used in the analysis. Formal statistical criteria for determining the number of 
segments, however, do not yet exist. As a guide to the selection of the optimal model, 
a number of authors have suggested the use information theoretic criteria tempered by 
the analyst’s own judgment (e.g. Swait, 1994; Boxal and Adamowicz, 2002; Scarpa 
and Thiene, 2005). In this paper, we use the Bayesian Information Criteria (BIC) as a 
guide to the selection of the optimal model. The criterion decreases monotonically as 
the number of segments increases but tend to flatten out from the two segment model, 
i.e. the improvements are much smaller from two to three and three to four segment 
model; this suggests a two segment solution may be appropriate
2
. It was also found 
that models with more than three segments suffered from many insignificant 
parameters due to extremely large standard errors. It was therefore decided that a two 
segment LCM was the preferred specification. Maximum likelihood estimates of this 
model are reported in Table 7.  
 
The results show that there is substantial heterogeneity in preferences for AES 
attributes across segments as indicated by differences in the magnitude, significance 
and signs of the parameters of the segment-specific utility functions (choice model in 
Table 7). The parameter estimates in the segment membership model in Table 7 
represent the effects of the farmer factors on the probability of membership in the 
various segments (note that these are the s coefficients in equation 7).  
  
                                                 
2
 The BIC values for four segments are 8864, 8324, 8038, 7973, in progressive order. The models were 
estimated using Limdep/Nlogit version 3.0 (Greene, 2002). 
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Table 7. Two segment latent class model estimates for AES attributes 
 Segment 1 Segment 2 
Choice model 
Attribute X Parameter |z-value| Parameter |z-value| 
Clength -0.045*** 14.8 -0.156*** 43.8 
FLand 0.674*** 16.9 0.760*** 17.6 
FMeas 0.721*** 18.3 0.331*** 7.1 
Highpw -0.368*** 8.3 -0.640*** 12.4 
Payment 0.104*** 36.8 0.0246*** 7.5 
Segment membership function 
Attribute Z     
Constant 0.909*** 6.6   
Age -0.324*** 2.6   
Education 0.156* 1.9   
Successor -0.000522 1.0   
Envicon 0.222* 1.9   
Lfarm 0.539*** 2.8   
Rentprop -0.844*** 5.6   
Fincdep -0.156* 1.9   
WTP estimates for AES attributes 
Clenght -0.43*** 15.4 -6.34*** 7.7 
FLand 6.47*** 14.8 30.82*** 6.2 
FMeas 6.92*** 15.9 13.45*** 4.2 
Highpw -3.54*** 8.3 -25.97*** 6.8 
*** 1% significance level; * 10% significance level 
 
 
For segment 1, the coefficients of all five AES attributes are significant and the 
segment membership model parameters reveal that higher education, higher 
environmental consciousness and larger farm holdings (defined here as those farms 
with more than 200 ha of land) increases the probability that the respondent belongs 
to segment 1. For the second segment, all the AES attributes are also highly 
significant determinants of choice and the segment membership coefficients show that 
older farmers, households that rent the majority of their holdings, and households that 
rely mainly on the farm for income are more likely to belong to this segment. It is 
found that 59% of the sample belongs to segment 1 and 41% belongs to the second 
segment. AES participants are slightly more highly represented in segment 1 (56%).  
 
Of significant interest are segment specific WTP estimates, reported at the bottom 
part of Table 7 all of which highly are statistically significant. While the direction of 
preferences are similar across the two segments (the WTP estimates all have the same 
sign), the relative magnitudes of the WTP estimates show the presence of substantial 
heterogeneity in preferences across the segments. Farmers in segment 2 exhibit a 
higher disutility for longer contracts, a substantially higher utility for flexibility and 
markedly greater disutility for paperwork compared to segment 1. Respondents in 
segment 1 are characterised as “low-resistance adopters” as their participation in 
schemes such as those portrayed in the choice experiments could be achieved by the 
offer of relatively low financial incentives. Compared to respondents in segment 2, 
these farmers are likely to demand far lower levels of compensation for: longer 
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contracts (about 0.5% of current per hectare payments for every additional year on the 
contract), reduced flexibility over land and measures (both around 6%) and high 
amounts of paperwork (about 3%). It seems reasonable that farmers with higher 
education levels (most likely to be members of segment 1) are less “worried” about 
paperwork than less educated ones (more likely to be members of segment 2). Also, 
as may be expected, larger farms (more likely to be in segment 1) seem to suffer less 
disutility from reduced flexibility over land or measures compared to smaller farms 
(more likely to be in segment 2).  
 
It is not surprising that the “types” of farms/farmers that have a higher probability of 
belonging to segment 1 mirror those that have been identified in the adoption 
literature being more likely to participate in AES. Various studies have found that 
youth, higher education, and positive attitudes towards the environment are significant 
pre-disposing factors to participation in AES (e.g. Wilson, 1997; Wynn et al., 2001). 
Other studies have also found that increasing farm size has a significant and positive 
influence on the probability of enrolling in AES (e.g. Vanslembrouck et al., 2002; 
Ducos et al., this issue). Farmers in segment 2 can be characterised as “high-resistance 
adopters” as they are more likely to suffer greater disutility from being in a scheme 
and require higher financial incentives as compensation. Based on the model, the 
incentives required by the high-resistance adopters ranged from an extra 6% of 
current per hectare payments for every additional year added to the length of a 
contract, to an additional 30% for contracts offering less flexibility over the area of 
land entered into to the scheme. As shown by the parameters of the segment 
membership model, the members of this segment are likely to be older, less well 
educated, less environmentally aware, and occupy smaller farm holding—again, all of 
these have been shown in previous studies as having a negative influence on AES 
adoption. Farmers in this segment are also more likely to be tenants and to rely on 
their farms for a greater proportion of their incomes.  
 
Conclusions 
A consistent pattern of farmer preferences was observed across our case study areas, 
and was common both to those who currently belonged to AES and those who did 
not. Predictably, results showed that, in general, farmers require greater financial 
incentives to join schemes with longer contract lengths, or that offer less flexibility or 
higher levels of paperwork. More interesting were the results of the latent class model 
which identified a large segment of farmers who require relatively small incentives to 
compensate them for the disutility associated with those particular aspects of joining a 
scheme. A greater number of existing scheme participants were found to belong to 
this ‘low-resistance adopter’ segment than to the contrasting ‘high-resistance adopter’ 
segment. Members of the low-resistance segment were found to have similar 
characteristics to those farmers identified in previous studies as being most likely to 
be participants in an agri-environment scheme.  These farmers tended to be better 
educated, younger and to have larger farm holdings and more positive attitudes to the 
environment than members of the high-resistance segment.  Members of the latter 
were more likely to be tenant farmers and to rely of the farm business for a greater 
proportion of their household incomes.  
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When looking at farmer factors that influenced preferences for contract length, the 
mixed logit model gave comparable findings to the LCM. In particular, the model 
suggested that farmers with successors, tenant farmers and those with smaller 
holdings all tended to prefer the added flexibility of shorter rather than longer 
contracts. 
 
Therefore, both models suggest that, perhaps predictably, most farmers would prefer 
schemes to be less restrictive in the elements examined by this study.  However, 
contracts that are shorter in duration and that allow farmers greater flexibility over 
land and measures may compromise the environmental effectiveness of a scheme. 
Indeed, more lengthy contracts may be desirable in schemes where the environmental 
objectives are long term, as is often the case, for example, with measures designed to 
aid biodiversity conservation or landscape change. Further, more restrictive scheme 
designs (such as the whole-farm approach) can help to avoid problems such as 
adverse selection and moral hazard where farmers may be able to enrol only those 
portions of land in the scheme that would yield the lowest environmental benefits.  
 
In these circumstances, our research confirms the assumption that higher payments 
could be offered to induce farmers to accept longer and less flexible contracts. Despite 
this, there is also evidence that a significant proportion of farmers require relatively 
low levels of incentive to participate in schemes with more restrictive prescriptions 
and higher administration costs.  This may, of course, reflect the lower magnitude of 
the opportunity costs of participation for these farmers rather than any high degree of 
support for AESs. Farmers in this category tend to have distinctive characteristics 
compared to the ‘high resistance adopter’ segment and it may be possible to use 
national agricultural census data to identify how common such farmers are in a given 
area. Within the constraints of international trade agreements, such information, 
would allow policy makers to consider the possibility of geographically specific 
payment strategies for AES. For example, to ensure better participation in a more 
restrictive scheme, higher incentives could be made available in areas characterised 
by a large population of ‘high-resistance adopters’. Less generous incentives may 
achieve desired participation levels if less restrictive scheme parameters are adopted 
or in areas where there are likely to be more ‘low-resistance adopters’. Further 
research is required to identify how closely correlated such payments would be to the 
opportunity costs of participation. 
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